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Although the current shortage of radio spectrum is usually attributed to the scarcity of 
spectrum, it is due to the inefficiency of legacy radio technologies and old systems of 
spectrum management. Regulatory reforms are being proposed to assign exclusive 
rights to spectrum, but such “market-oriented” allocation would be harmful because 
the spectrum is not a property but a protocol by which information is carried. New 
packet radio technologies enable efficient communications by sharing a wide band 
without licenses. However, it is difficult to relocate spectrum by persuading 
incumbents to give back their spectrum. Therefore we propose reverse auctions by 
which the government buys back spectrum from incumbents as an optional 
mechanism for spectrum relocation. The equilibrium price of this reverse auction will 
be much cheaper than that of ordinary spectrum auctions, because the former price 
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The use of radio waves for communications dates back to the beginning of the last century. The 
Radio Act of the United States was enacted in 1912, after the tragedy of the Titanic, when 
airwaves failed to communicate SOS signals to ships nearby. Initially radio communications 
were limited to military and marine use, but the Radio Act was revised in 1927 to allow private 
companies to use radio waves as a result of heightened calls for the release for business use. 
Although industrial sectors sought full freedom, the federal government (particularly the Navy) 
opposed the release of bandwidth to civilian sectors. As a compromise between these interests, 
the current licensing system for electromagnetic spectrum was established under the Federal 
Radio Commission, predecessor of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  
As the wireless technologies available at the time did not enable general users to hold two-way 
communications, radio stations broadcast signals, and the receiver, the radio, did nothing but 
convert airwaves into sound. Since the signals were broadcast at high power, licenses were 
awarded for entire regions. The FCC gives a broadcasting station a license for a specific 
frequency, power, area, and usage. This licensing system was extended to communications and 
has not changed in the past 75 years. This “socialistic” system worked fairly well when there 
were many vacancies in the spectrum, but growing demand for wireless communications, led by 
cellular telephone usage, has led to a serious “spectrum shortage”. 
This “shortage” is not a problem of natural resources, but is instead the result of inefficient 
radio administration. In a market economy, government licensing is an exceptional mechanism. It 
is usually justified by the claim that spectrum is a “scarce resource,” but economists have long 
argued, “the number of Rembrandts existing at a given time is limited; yet such paintings are 
commonly disposed of by auction.” (Coase 1959: p.20). In accordance with such 
recommendations, spectrum auctions for cellular telephones (PCS) began in the United States in 
1994. At first, FCC officials were skeptical because these were the first large-scale auctions--
conducted for 99 licenses simultaneously across the United States--managed by complicated 
mechanisms designed by economists and implemented by nation-wide computer networks. As it 
turned out, the PCS auctions were a dramatic success. The U.S. government earned more than 
US$20 billion in six PCS auctions through 1996, and the U.S. cellular-phone industry developed 
rapidly through the entrance of new operators and enhanced competition (Milgrom 2004:ch.1).  
   European countries, which had been leading the world in mobile communications, embraced 
the auction concept to promote competition and regional integration through the entry of 
international operators to many countries for third-generation (3-G) mobile telephones. When 3-
G auctions were held in 2000, at the peak of the “wireless bubble,” license fees skyrocketed far 
beyond their true value, with fees amounting to more than 100 billion euro for all of Europe. 
After the bubble collapsed, the expected market for “mobile multimedia” proved almost 
nonexistent. Mobile operators in Europe fell into a business crisis due to their huge liabilities. 
Deployment of 3-G services was delayed or even aborted due to technical problems and financial 
difficulties. 
Economists argued that it was not the auction but the operators' extremely speculative behavior 
that was to blame. Through auctions, at least theoretically, spectrum can be allocated efficiently if 
 2operators behave rationally. This would be better than traditional licensing by paper examinations, 
known as “beauty contests,” in promoting competition and in realizing the full value of spectrum 
(Klemperer-Binmore 2002). Yet it is undeniable that auctions induced a “winner’s curse,” which 
though not described by rational behavior occurs repeatedly in financial markets. An even more 
important problem is that spectrum auctions depend on the legacy systems of telephone switching. 
This system is inefficient and expensive to operate in the Internet age, as has been evidenced by 
the tragedy of 3G. 
A final problem is that very little spectrum is available for auction. Relocation of spectrum is 
conducted by governments after the removal of incumbent operators by negotiation, which takes 
a long time. Since spectrum is allotted by licenses for specific use, even if a band is idle, no one 
is allowed to use it and incumbents cannot convert it to a different use. As a result, it is estimated 
that, integrating space and time, more than 90 percent of the spectrum under 3 GHz in the 
metropolitan area of Tokyo is not used. Rural areas must be even less efficient. Obviously, 
spectrum auctions cannot cure the problem. 
While 3G is stumbling, Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) have been growing rapidly, 
as they can realize much higher speeds than cellular telephones by sharing a wide band. This 
“second coming of the Internet” (Werbach 2002) will change wireless communications as 
fundamentally as the wired Internet changed the telephone network. WLAN and other new digital 
wireless technologies are demanding a wholesale revision of radio administration to cope with 
these innovations. It is much more efficient to open the spectrum without licensing requirements 
than it is to divide it into small pieces of private property. Clearly, the regulatory framework 
inherited from an age when there was no transistor, radar, or television is due for an overhaul. 
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we will examine the primary assumption of 
spectrum auctions, namely, that spectrum is a scarce resource. It can be overcome by new 
wireless technologies such as packet radio, spread spectrum, cognitive radio. In section 3, we will 
show that spectrum is not “commons” but “public goods” that can be used without congestion if 
terminals are intelligent and that it is harmful to “privatize” spectrum. In section 4, a mechanism 
named spectrum buyouts that encourages transition to a new regime of radio administration 
system is proposed. According to this proposal, the government would take back spectrum from 
incumbents by reverse auctions and open it without a license. In the concluding section, we argue 
that this new regulatory framework will realize more efficient communication based on facility-
based competition between wired and wireless communications.  
 




s Spectrum a Scarce Resource? 
The auction was hit upon as a mechanism for allocating spectrum efficiently, but it was based on 
the old assumption that the spectrum is a scarce resource that the government has the right to 
allocate. Almost ten years ago, Paul Baran, the inventor of packet radio, and George Gilder, a 
telecom guru, argued against PCS auction that it would make the implementation of packet radio 
technologies more difficult. 
 
 3The FCC is fostering a real estate paradigm for the spectrum. You buy or lease spectrum as you would a 
spread of land. Once you have your license, you can use it any way you want as long as you don’t 
unduly disturb the neighbors. You rent a stretch of beach and build a wall. [Packet radio] system, by 
contrast, suggests a model not of a beach but of an ocean. You can no more lease electromagnetic 
waves than you can lease ocean waves. (Gilder 1994:p.6) 
 
Noam (1998: p. 771) also questions “Could the state sell off the right to the color red? To the 
frequency high A-flat?” He cited the licensing of spectrum as a violation of the freedom of the 
press. To understand this problem, it is necessary to distinguish frequency from spectrum. 
Frequency is not a resource but a parameter used to modulate original data (baseband) into radio 
waves, so it cannot be scarce any more than amplitude and phase are (Benkler 1999). In radio 
communications, transmitters modulate basebands into airwaves by mixing them with carriers of 
a specific frequency and send the wave in radial form. Receivers identify radio signals by tuning 
in to the desired frequency and filtering out other frequencies. Let the radio amplitude be A, the 
frequency q, the phase p, and the time t. Then, carrier c can be expressed by  
 
c(t) = A cos (qt+p).  
 
The amplitude modulation (AM) system modulates basebands by A, and the frequency 
modulation (FM) system modulates them by the change in p. When basebands are modulated into 
radio waves, they are distinguished by the frequencies of their carriers. Sending multiple signals 
on the same carrier causes interference. Therefore interference is not a problem of scarcity but 
rather a result of confusion by receivers that cannot distinguish signals from noise (Reed 2002). 
So a frequency can be used by multiple users if their receivers can identify signals. 
On the other hand, spectrum has limited capacity. According to Shannon’s Channel Capacity 
Formula, the channel capacity C (bits per second) is limited by the bandwidth, B (Hertz): 
 
C = B log2 (1+S/N), 
 
where S is the power of the signal (in watts), and N is the noise level (W/Hz). In analog radio, as 
it is impossible to distinguish signals of the same frequency, spectrum should be divided into 
small portions to avoid interference. And, since N is given physically, the only way to do this is 
to magnify S to discern signals from noise. Thus radio signals are sent in narrow bands and at 
high power to large areas. If B  is divided into small portions of equal size, b1, b2,…bn and 
allocated to each licensee, each licensee can get at most C/n of capacity. The inefficiency of this 
high power and narrow band radio system did not matter when radio equipment was very 
expensive and a small part of the spectrum was utilized, but it is posing serious problems today.  
Cellular phones depend on the circuit switching in which each user occupies a band 
exclusively even if no signals are transmitted. A digital wireless technology called packet radio 
extends B by sending different packets in a band. Packet switching was invented as a radio 
transmission system by Paul Baran in 1964, but it had not been deployed until TCP/IP 
(Transmission Protocol/Internet Protocol) was adopted in ARPANET, the predecessor of the 
Internet, in the 1970s. As packet switching encapsulates data into many packets that can be mixed 
 4into one line, many users can send their data in a single line. This is much cheaper than the circuit 
switching of telephone systems, in which every user occupies one line during communication.  
However, we cannot exclude undesired signals by physical lines in wireless communications. 
So traditional wireless technologies of mobile telephones were based on the frequency division of 
spectrum. Packet radio, in contrast, avoid the interference by identifying individual packets even 
if multiple signals are carried in the same frequency. Spectrum is used efficiently by statistical 
multiplexing, which levels traffic in a wide band. As average traffic usually represents a very 
small portion (less than 10%) of the maximum capacity, if 100 users share a bandwidth of 20 
MHz, more than 2 MHz is available for each user on average. This is obviously more efficient 
than allotting 200 kHz across 100 users. 
If B is large, it is not necessary to magnify S to increase C. Lowering power makes it possible 
to multiply spectrum by establishing many stations. This low power and wide band system makes 
digital radio more efficient than traditional broadcasting systems. The problem is thus not the 
scarcity but the efficiency of spectrum usage. Therefore, bandwidth can be better shared by many 
WLAN terminals. If a wide band can be utilized by many users identifying signals packet by 
packet, this will be much more efficient than dividing spectrum into narrow bands and selling 
them to individual users.  
A packet radio technology called spread spectrum has been widely adopted to send various 
packets in a band while avoiding interference. In the direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) 
adopted in WLAN, transmitters multiply original signals (baseband) by pseudo-noise (encryption 
key) and spread the resulting signals into thin waves over a wide band using weak power (Figure 
1). Receivers decode the airwaves by inverse spreading, in which the signals are multiplied by the 
inverse pseudo-noise. By multiplying and dividing the baseband by the same number, this 
process recovers the desired data but scatters the noise thinly to allow its elimination by filters
1. 
Thus it is not necessary to have a separate frequency for each station to prevent interference. A 
number of users can use full bandwidth by multiplexing and identifying individual packets by 
their spread codes. Spread-spectrum technology was invented during World War II to prevent 
interception and electromagnetic jamming of military communications. It was later adopted for 
communications in the unlicensed band (2.4 - 2.5 GHz) to prevent interference from other 
devices such as microwave ovens. This band is called the ISM (Industrial, Scientific, and 
Medical) band, because it was originally released for unlicensed use by hospitals, factories, and 
so on, rather than for communication purposes. 
WLAN technology, standardized in the 802.11 Committee of the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), initially attracted little attention because its speed was only 2 
Mbps. But after the enhanced mode IEEE 802.11b (Wi-Fi) was standardized in 1999, WLAN 
exploded; within a few years the number of users worldwide grew to more than 30 million (2002 
figure). This is because 802.11b realized up to 11 Mbps (3-4 Mbps on average) by sharing the 
wide ISM band (22 MHz per channel)
2. In contrast, the speed of data communications in current 
                                                 
1 There are several technologies referred to as spread spectrum. Frequency hopping changes transmission frequencies 
randomly over very short periods of time. CDMA and OFDM are sometimes denoted as spread-spectrum 
technologies in a broader sense. For more technical details, see Rappaport (2001). 
2 WLAN spreads the same signal several times, so the transmission efficiency per frequency of 801.11b stands at 11 
Mbps/22 MHz = 0.5, similar to that of cellular telephones. 
 52-G mobile telephones is around 10 kbps due to bandwidth limitations. For example, the PDC 
adopted in Japan allocates only 25 kHz (12.5 KHz in “half-rate” mode) per user.  
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ultiplexing by Space, Time, and Power 
The method of multiplexing airwaves for many users is not limited to frequency. Shannon’s 
Formula represents the limit of capacity in a given place, but it can be extended by multiplying 
stations because different users can use the same band repeatedly in separate places. This is the 
cellular technology by which mobile telephones enhanced bandwidth over traditional usage. The 
WLAN band is separated into a number of channels, which are allocated to each low-power 
station. As shown in Figure 2, channel A can be used repeatedly by dividing an area into many 
microcells in which each user can utilize full capacity without interference from other terminals. 
If the band is wide enough to allow division into many channels, theoretically, the capacity can 
be multiplied infinitely by dividing an area into an infinite number of cells
3.  
Of course, the overhead cost of connection between base stations will limit the number of cells 
in reality. But if they can be connected by wireless networks, this cost could be reduced. For 
WLAN terminals to be used as base stations in ad hoc mode, completely distributed multi-hop 
networks called wireless mesh, which link terminals to each other directly, can be built by 
WLAN terminals. If the price of WLAN chips falls to several dollars – as is likely in a few years 
– they will be incorporated into a wide range of devices that can communicate with each other. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Theoretically, four channels are sufficient to fill the space, as is known from the four-color problem in mathematics, 
if the base stations are coordinated. But there are usually many users who use channels randomly, so more than ten 














Figure 2: Microcells 
 
In this regard, WLAN is even more revolutionary than wired Internet. TCP/IP is characterized by 
the architecture referred to as End-to-End (E2E), which means that the communication is 
controlled only by senders and receivers. In the wired Internet, however, routing and addressing 
are mostly performed by Internet Service Providers (ISP) because networks are built on the 
telephone-type topology. WLAN has deconstructed the centralized architecture and enabled 
completely decentralized E2E structures physically. Such ad hoc networks have been built 
throughout the world by volunteer organizations.  
Public networks can be built by linking local wireless networks called hot spots in restaurants, 
hotels, airports, and so on. But the quality of the 2.4-GHz band is unsatisfactory. Industrial dryers, 
medical equipment, and different types of communication terminals such as Bluetooth interfere 
with WLAN. And the bandwidth (less than 100 MHz for 4 channels simultaneously) would not 
be sufficient if many operators built base stations in the same place. The quality of the 5-GHz 
band is higher than that of the 2.4-GHz band, although the higher the frequency (i.e., the shorter 
the wavelength), the heavier the attenuation, and the more vulnerable communication becomes to 
obstacles.  
In the United States, 300 MHz is available within the Unlicensed National Information 
Infrastructure (U-NII) band at 5-GHz band. The European Union is planning to open 580 MHz 
for HiperLAN without a licensing requirement, which can be divided into more than 25 channels 
in which up to 54 Mbps can be transmitted in each channel with IEEE 802.11a
4. In Japan, 
however, there is no unlicensed outdoor band at 5-GHz band; only 160 MHz is available by 
license and 100 MHz is available indoors without a license.  
   There is another dimension by which we can utilize spectrum efficiently: time. According to 
FCC Chairman Michael Powell (2002), 
 
Since the beginning of spectrum policy, the government has “parceled” this resource in frequency and 
in space. We permitted use in a particular band over a particular geographic region often with an 
expectation of perpetual use. Like Einstein who dramatically theorized on the importance of the time 
dimension almost 90 years ago, the Commission now should also look at time as an additional 
dimension for spectrum policy.  
 
                                                 
4 IEEE 802.11a, launched on the market in 2001, operates in the 5-GHz band. 802.11g (compatible with 802.11b), 
standardized in 2002, operates in the 2.4-GHz band. HiSWAN is the name of the European standard. All of these 
systems yield a maximum speed of 54 Mbps. 
 7For example, meteorological radars occupy 5.25-35 GHz, but they use the band for only a few 
minutes per hour. If other terminals can sense the radar waves and stop using the channel while 
the radar is working, they can work together in a channel. Such adaptive technologies, known as 
cognitive radio, have been standardized and implemented into some 802.11a chipsets
5. Dividing 
bandwidth by time, these technologies enables WLAN base stations to coexist with other 
terminals in a band and realize much more efficient use of idle spectrum. For example, 300 MHz 
of the UHF band is allotted to TV stations, but less than a half of it is used in Japan. So if WLAN 
terminals equipped with cognitive radio technologies can detect vacant channels and use them, 
more than 100 MHz of spectrum can be “created.” If such overlay usage is allowed in all bands, 
available bandwidth will be so large that its allocation would not be necessary.  
Software-Defined Radio (SDR)
6 will make such adaptation even easier by changing physical 
layers by software, just like applications for PCs. And smart antennas, combining various 
antenna elements with a single processor, can change the transmission/reception mode in 
response to the communication environment. If a channel is occupied by 802.11a, other terminals 
can change its modulation to 802.11a by SDR. To deploy SDR, however, regulatory reforms will 
be necessary: the present Radio Act bans non-standardized communication devices by 
certification of equipment, but if communication is performed by software, it would make no 
sense to certify the equipment.  
There is yet another dimension of multiplexing: power. Part 15 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations defines the admitted noise level for unlicensed devices. Ultra-Wide Band (UWB)
7 is 
the technology to use such very weak signals that cannot be distinguished from the radio noise 
generated by TVs, computers, and hair dryers. In contrast to the conventional radio technology 
that modulates baseband with a carrier (sine curve), UWB modulates the baseband with very 
short pulses (less than a nanosecond). This technology realizes high-speed transmission (up to 
500 Mbps) by emitting pulses in a wide band, over a frequency range of several GHz. Since their 
waveforms are completely different from those of conventional radio waves and are emitted at 
very low power levels, advocates of UWB claim, the system will make overlay use possible over 
all bands without interference. In fact, however, interference was found in experiments conducted 
by the FCC. In February 2002, the FCC authorized UWB with very conservative restrictions for 
its band (above 3.1GHz) and with weak power. Therefore, for the time being, use of UWB will be 
limited to indoor use. 
 





In November 2002, the FCC published a report written by the Spectrum Policy Task Force 
(SPTF). Summarizing a half year of extensive research and discussion, the report is indeed 
                                                 
5  DFS (Dynamic Frequency Selection) and TPC (Transmission Power Control) have been standardized by the 
802.11h Committee of the IEEE. The E.U. committee authorized DFS and TPC in the 5-GHz band.  
6   cf. SDR Forum,  http://www.sdrforum.org. SDR is included in cognitive radio in the broad sense. The 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is planning to adopt SDR for so-called “4th-generation mobile 
communications”. 
7 cf. UWB Working Group, http://www.uwb.org 
 8impressive in its deep understanding of digital wireless technologies and its call for bold reforms. 
Particularly noteworthy is the FCC's commitment to depart from the command and control 
approach that regulates usage by licensing. It is also remarkable that the FCC recognized the 
efficiency of the commons approach. 
However, the SPTF's conclusion is a half-hearted compromise between the commons model 
and the exclusive rights model, according to which incumbents can sell and buy their spectrum on 
secondary markets. SPTF insists that this “market-oriented” approach is more efficient than the 
commons approach for the band in which “scarcity is relatively high and transaction costs 
associated with market-based negotiation of access rights are relatively low” (FCC 2002: p.38). 
According to them, the spectrum is scarce below 5 GHz because of its propagation characteristics 
and “high level of incumbent use.” If they are not excluded as private property, they claim, “The 
Tragedy of the Commons” would take place. 
This justification is incorrect because the scarcity is not related to private ownership; roads and 
parks, for example, are supplied as commons even though they are scarce. In standard economics, 
a resource is efficiently allocated as private property if its consumption is rival, i.e., the marginal 
cost of joint consumption is large, and its supply is excludable, i.e., the transaction (excluding) 
cost is small, as is shown in Figure 3. If a resource is rival but non-excludable, it is efficient to 
supply it as a common pool resource (CPR)
 8. Examples of CPR are fisheries, roads, and 
streetlights. Non-rival and non-excludable resources are best supplied as (pure) public goods. 
Examples of public goods are mathematical theorems and communication protocols
9. 
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Figure 3: Private goods, public goods, and the commons 
 
In other words, resources can be allocated efficiently in market mechanisms if the externalities of 
supply and consumption are small. In principle, such externalities can be internalized by 
institutional arrangement to divide resources and assign property rights to the parts, but common 
resources are often too complicated to divide (Coase 1960). Furthermore, such “privatization” is 
inefficient for information, because privatization makes it impossible to share the externalities of 
innovation, whose social value is usually larger than the private benefit of the innovator. This 
 
8 CPR are often managed by community norms (Ostrom 1991), but it is irrelevant for spectrum. 
9  Resources that are non-rival but excludable are advisable to be supplied as club goods, e.g., pay-TV and 
subscription services. See for example Stiglitz (2000). 
 9seems to be a classical trade-off between incentives and efficiency of information, but it is not the 
case for spectrum. Exclusion is necessary only in so far as the spectrum is separated by frequency. 
If terminals are intelligent, they can allocate spectrum dynamically by identifying each other’s 
signals without exclusion.  
Thus the analogy of spectrum as “commons” is misleading because the spectrum is not CPR 
but public goods. Too many people quote the “tragedy” that has nothing to do with the spectrum 
whose marginal consumption cost is zero if it is used efficiently
10. Rivalry among multiple users 
of spectrum can be eliminated using packet radio technologies that increase the network capacity 
by adding stations and terminals. Since they can be shared and used without limits, it does not 
make sense to allocate them by market mechanisms. Therefore, to avoid the semantic confusion, 
we compare spectrum to protocol
11  with which information is carried. For example, the 
“scarcity” of IP addresses can be overcome technically by extending the address spaces with IPv6 





pen Spectrum Management 
Radically new technologies such as WLAN, SDR, and UWB are demanding a “new spectrum 
policy paradigm” in Chairman Powell’s words. Noam (1998) proposed a reform named open 
access. If you allocate bandwidth dynamically, this will be far more efficient than the current 
system of static allocation. If demand is lower than capacity, everybody can access bandwidth 
freely. If demand exceeds capacity, a “clearing house” charges fees for wireless traffic, acting as a 
tollbooth. It is much harder to charge for airwaves than for cars because the former do not pass 
through specific gates, so this proposal has been regarded as unrealistic. However, digital 
technologies such as spread spectrum have now rendered this idea feasible.  
If bandwidth were to be supplied to an extent greatly exceeding demand, so as to become free 
goods, open access would become possible without fees. Even if bandwidth did not exceed 
demand, however, the allocation of packets by spread spectrum would be more efficient than 
charging for packets. Packets in the wired Internet are stored and forwarded by routers without 
charge. Congestion leads to waiting, but this is not a very serious problem in data 
communications and can be overcome by widening the bandwidth. Already we can reach up to 
108 Mbps by using two channels of 802.11a together. UWB has realized 500 Mbps and its 
capacity will easily extend to more than 1 Gbps.  
In the long run, the spectrum should be maintained by public administration that makes rules 
and enforces them by monitoring abuses. However, “Public” does not necessarily mean 
“governmental.” Today the Internet is preserved by hundreds of millions of users worldwide 
without any government control. Standardization of radio equipment by the government has 
ended with the failure of 3G. Today, such non-profit organizations (NPO) as IEEE and the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) have taken over the role of the ITU. Of course, this does 
not mean that government regulation is unnecessary. Even if there is sufficient bandwidth, 
interference will occur between different physical layers. One way to prevent such interference is 
                                                 
10 Hardin’s famous article (1968) emphasizes that the Tragedy will occur if “[n]o technical solution can rescue us 
from the misery of overpopulation”. 
11 Werbach (2003) points out similar confusion with “commons” and adopt a neologism “supercommons”. 
12 IPv6 is, however, not likely to replace IPv4. See Ikeda-Yamada (2002). 
 10to fix a physical layer (modulation) for each band; for example, 802.11b for 2-3 GHz and 802.11a 
for 3-6 GHz. Some argue against unlicensed usage because such physical regulation will impede 
innovation (Hazlett 2001), but regulation is not necessary for this purpose. For example, if a 
channel is occupied by Bluetooth, WLAN can use another channel by sensing the carrier. If there 
is sufficient bandwidth and flexible technologies such as cognitive radio are deployed, various 
physical layers can coexist in different channels. 
To coordinate various kinds of terminals to work cooperatively, regulating channels, powers, 
frequencies, and modulations of different terminals will be the important task of radio 
administration. Traditional regulation has focused on transmitters, but it is also necessary to 
regulate receivers to control interference among different types of terminals. Since digital 
receivers are much more tolerant of interference than analog ones, there should be more flexible 
criterion interference temperature, according to the FCC’s term, to enable different systems to 
coexist in a band. Such regulation should be enforced not for operators but for manufacturers 
because communication terminals will exist as ordinary electronic appliances independent of 
operators and service providers. The standardization can be left to the NPO, but the certification 
of equipment and monitoring of abuse should be carried out by the government.  
It is a challenge for regulators to coordinate different modulation systems in a band. Even if 
cognitive radio terminals can allocate channels dynamically, some priority might have to be 
placed in order to guarantee the bandwidth for moving terminals. It would be better to secure 
device rights that define the priority to use a channel than to allocate fixed spectrum. For example, 
the government can reserve some channels for mobile IP phones. Mobile phones can use all 
channels in a band and preempt the “mobile channel” even if other modulation systems use the 
channel; other data transmission can use the mobile channels only if they are not occupied by 
mobile phones. Instead the government can charge mobile terminals extra fees, which can be 
priced by auctions. Although it is most important to supply sufficient capacity to render abuse 
unnecessary and harmless, surveillance and enforcement might have to be intensified, at least 
transitionally. 
 




trategy for Transition 
During the transition period, licensed and unlicensed bands will coexist, but the criteria by which 
the spectrum rights are specified should be determined not by the so-called scarcity but by the 
excludability (efficiency of exclusion) of a band. Above 3 GHz, it is pointless to exclude 
spectrum because there is no new technology that depends on frequency division in that band. 
Exclusion might be justified in the extremely lower band (probably below 30 MHz) where high-
power propagation is economical and no digital radio technology is likely to be implemented. In 
the intermediate band, the easement of overlay usage should be enforced.  
  Thus a strategy of transition to more efficient technologies is necessary. As SPTF insists, 
spectrum policy must “provide incentives for users to migrate to more technologically innovative 
and economically efficient uses of spectrum” (FCC 2002: p.15). To achieve the goal, however, it 
seems that the FCC is going to give spectrum away to incumbents as their private property and 
 11let them use it efficiently. At the same time when the SPTF report was published, economists at 
the Office of Plans and Policy of the FCC published a working paper to prescribe the “Big Bang 
auction” that would enable incumbents to sell and buy all spectrum freely (Kwerell-Williams 
2002).  
Indeed this system would be politically easy to accomplish because incumbents will love it. 
However, there would exist a danger that exclusive rights would authorize incumbents to exclude 
other parties’ more efficient usage. If spectrum were sold at a high price, the “owner” of 
spectrum would maximize its value by differentiating it with proprietary protocols. This is 
rational behavior for individual users, but it would lead to socially inefficient outcomes. Even 
worse, such a policy is irreversible; once spectrum is given away to incumbents, it would be lost 
forever because incumbents would never open it. Easement would be harder to enforce because 
incumbents would protect their private property by resisting such “regulatory taking”, as the local 
carriers did to the unbundling regulation for digital subscriber lines. 
 Legally, of course, governments can take back the spectrum as licenses expire. The Ministry 
of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (MPHPT) of Japan 
announced a plan for such ruling in November 2002. MPHPT is going to rule that, if licenses 
expire, licensees must return their spectrum with compensation for the remaining book value of 
their equipment. As the term of license is five years and the term of amortization is six years, the 
average licensee’s remaining value is very small. This is legitimate but difficult to enforce. If 
incumbents resist, it would take a long time to evict them by negotiation; MPHPT estimates that 
it would take 10 years to clear the 4-GHz band. Worse, many incumbents would refuse the 
“taking” of spectrum on which their business depends and regulatory nightmare would result. 
 Such a problem can be resolved by breaking it down into two parts; it is important to motivate 
incumbents to exit by compensation, but it is harmful to admit them exclusive rights for the 
spectrum. So it is advisable for the government to take back their spectrum through reverse 
auctions and then open the acquired spectrum without a license requirement
13. This mechanism 
can be implemented as an ordinary procurement process by which the lowest bidder sells 





The government should “clear” a band by taking back all the stations in the band nationwide, but 
it is not necessary to open all spectrum because, for example, 1 GHz might be enough to supply 
the bandwidth for WLAN in current use. As it is difficult to evaluate too many different bands, 
the government should focus on some specific bands.
14  However, if the government announces 
in advance that it will buy all spectrum for a specific band, as in the usual case of   eminent 
domain, the “squatters” who resist it will get huge windfalls. Thus it would be better to have 
(groups of) incumbents competing to offer the low prices.   
                                                 
13 This problem is similar to that of intellectual property rights. As a complementary mechanism to patent licensing, 
Kremer (1998) proposed a mechanism called the “patent buyout” in which the government buys patents from 
inventors through auctions and opens the patents to everyone. This mechanism can supply incentives for inventors 
t does not prevent others from copying the invention.  bu 14 In Japan, the best candidate for WLAN band is the 3-5 GHz used for business-use communications and the 
backbones of mobile telephone networks. 
 
 12To simplify the analysis, let’s assume that there are n firms in the market, each possessing one 
license with a particular “frequency”
 15. (For example, a firm having a license with “frequency” 
4.1 GHz means that this firm possesses frequencies ranging from 4.10 GHz to 4.19 GHz.) The 
auction design depends on the goals set by the government. To start with, let’s assume that the 
government’s objective is to buy back K least efficiently used frequencies (efficient buyouts).  
In this case the government can conduct a uniform-price auction. The rule is as follows: each 
firm bids a price for its own license (frequency). Based on the bids, the K firms with the K lowest 
bids become the “winners” (to sell their frequencies). The government pays each winner a 
uniform price which is equal to the K+1st lowest bid. Under such an auction, all firms will bid 
their own (privately estimated) valuation of their licenses truthfully (“incentive compatible”), and 
the government will indeed procure the K licenses with the least efficient uses.  The mechanism 
underlying this auction design is called VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism.
16 As is well 
known, VCG mechanism is efficient and induces truthful reporting as dominant strategies.           
Since simple maximization of bandwidth may result in fragmentation of the band into many 
small pieces, there should be requirements on bands; for example, the band should contain 
continuous frequencies for at least 50 MHz. Since this kind of requirement is more relevant in 
practice, in what follows we propose a modified VCG mechanism to achieve efficient spectrum 
buyouts with a minimal bandwidth requirement. 
   We start with a description of the model. We assume that n firms possess a set of spectrum 
licenses with frequencies ranging from  1 f  to  n f  “continuously” ( 12 ... n f ff < < ).
17 We assume 
that each firm possesses exactly one license, i.e., firm i possesses license i with frequency  i f , 
  The government wants to procure licenses from these firms. There is minimal 
bandwidth requirement, e.g., the band should be “continuous” for more than 50 MHz. In our case, 
we assume that this requirement is equivalent to procuring K  licenses  with  consecutive 
frequencies ranging from low to high where K is much smaller than n. The government’s goal is 
to procure K  consecutive licenses we call “band group” with minimal budget. We assume that 
each firm ( ) has a private valuation for the license it owns. Let this private valuation be 
1,2,..., . i =
i
n
i θ .  i θ  is 
only observed by firm  .  In the event that the government procures license i at price  , firm i’s 
profit by selling the license is as follows: 
i i t
 
 (; ) ii i i i tt π θθ = −  (1.1) 
 
We consider a procurement mechanism conducted by the government. The government first asks 
the n firms to report their private valuations (their “types”). Given a report profile  1 ( ,..., ) n θ θθ =
( )) n x
, 
the mechanism is characterized by the procurement decision xx 1 ( ) ( ( ),..., θ θθ =  and  the 
                                                 
15 When each firm’s bandwidth is not the same, we can normalize the bandwidth by setting the “unit band” as 1 MHz, 
for example. In that case, a firm sells multiple unit bands at the same time. It complicates the formulation, but will 
not affect our main results that an efficient mechanism exists. 
16 Under a VCG mechanism, all agents are required to report their “types” (e.g., private values). VCG mechanism 
employs the efficient decision rule (value-maximizing) and the payment rule is specified such that reporting 
truthfully is a dominant strategy for each agent. The second-price auction is one example of VCG mechanism. For 
details see, e.g., Milgrom (2004). 
17 For example, we may use 1 to represent the frequencies ranging from 4.10 GHz to 4.19 GHz, and  4.1 f = 2 4.2 f = to 
represent the frequencies ranging from 4.20 GHz to 4.29 GHz, and so on. 
 13payment or transfer tt 12 ( ) ( ( ),..., ( )) t θ θ = θ , where  ( ) i x θ  takes value either 1 or 0, and t ( ) i θ  is the 
payment made from government to firm i. When  1 i x = , license  is procured by the government; 
when  , license i remains at firm i’s hand. Due to the minimal band requirement, for any 
given 
i
0 i x =
θ ,  () x X θ ∈ where   which  means 
that only  licenses  with K consecutive frequencies can be procured (so each feasible 
{(1,...,1,0 X = ,...,0), 1,0,...,0) ...,(0,..0,1,...,1)} (0,1,..., ,
K ( ) x θ  




() i x K θ
=
= ∑
(, vx ) jj x j j θ θ = ⋅
   (, ) ii θ θθ − =
*() a r g x 
1




v x  (, j θ θ
∈ = ∑ ∈
    * ( () , ( ) i i xh () ij
ji
tv) j θ θθ θ −
≠
=− + ∑
 ( i i ) θ − 
i θ

i θ − i





( ii xi θ θθ θ −− − θ
   
We call the above problem the constrained procurement problem faced by the government 
(constrained by the minimal band requirement, or equivalently, constrained by the set X ). We 
define efficient procurement in this context as the procurement in which the government procures 
a set of licenses with the lowest total value while maintaining the minimal bandwidth 
requirement. It turns out that we can use a modified version of VCG mechanism to achieve 
efficient procurement in this context. For notational convenience, we write  
   (1.2)   
Then given a report profile  , the efficient procurement decision rule is given by  
   (1.3) 
 
Choose the following payment rule (the Groves’ payment rule): 
 
   (1.4) 
where h  is some function not depending on  . In words, set the payment to firm i equal to 
the “externality” that i’s report imposes on other firms.  
 
Proposition:  Truthful reporting is a dominant strategy in the mechanism with efficient 
procurement rule given by (1.3) and payment rule given by (1.4). 
 
Proof:  Given any report profile by other firms  , firm   solves the following problem: 
 
   (1.5) 
 




     ** m i n ((, ) , ) ((, ) ,)
i




i θ θθ θ θθ −
≠
+ ∑ −  (1.6) 
Note that   ( i i ) h θ −  does not affect i ’s choice and hence is left out in the above minimization 
objective function. Note also that firm i ’s report 
i θ   only matters through its effect on the 
decision    *(, i ) i x θ θ − . So alternatively we can ask which decision the firm wants to implement: 
 14   min ( , ) ( , ) j ji xX
ji
vx vxi θ θ
∈
≠
+ ∑  (1.7) 
By (1.3),  the optimal decision   ** (, ) i i xx θ θ − = . Note that this can be achieved by choosing 

i i θ θ =  in the original problem (1.6), which implies that truthful reporting is dominant strategy 
for the firms.  Q.E.D. 
 
As in Clarke (1971), we can choose the following functional form for  ( ) i h ⋅ : 
 
     * () (() , i ij i
ji
hv x ) i j θ θθ − −
≠
= − ∑  (1.8) 
where   * ( i i x ) θ − −  means the efficient decision rule when the frequency  i f  (thus the band group that 
contains it) is not sold. It can be verified that when h ( ) i ⋅  is given by (1.8), then the payments 
given by (1.4) are always nonnegative.  Specifically, only those firms who sell their licenses get 
positive payments, while those who don’t sell end up with zero payments.  
Some have argued that such an auction would be extremely costly, referencing the prices of 
PCS auctions, but this is not the case. In an ordinary spectrum auction, the equilibrium price will 
be equal to the net present value (NPV) of the most efficient use of spectrum. On the contrary, in 
our reverse auction, the price will be approximately equal to the opportunity cost of the least 
efficient  use of spectrum. To see this, we consider some simple examples and see how the 
mechanism characterized above works. Suppose there are 20 firms, holding licenses with 
frequencies of 10 MHz ranging from 4.00 GHz to 4.19 GHz. Suppose the licensees, the bands, 
and their private valuations for their licenses are listed below: 
 
  1     2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20
th licensee  
4.00 01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08   09   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   GHz  
.5   .6   .2   .4   .3   .2   .3   .2   .8    .4    .9    .5    .5    .8    .5    .2    .4    .1    .3    .4    billion yen
 
Suppose the government conducts a modified VCG mechanism as described above to procure   
licenses. Since this mechanism induces truthful reporting as dominant strategies, in equilibrium 
all firms will truthfully report their private valuations as shown in the table above.  Given this 




* () ( ( ) , ) ( () , ) ij i i j j
ji ji
tv x v x
*
j θ θθ θ θ −−
≠≠
=− ∑∑  (1.9) 
 
First we consider the case in which K 5 = . According to the (constrained) efficient rule, the 
following decision is one efficient procurement outcome: 
 
   
* 1               for  3,4,5,6,7








 15Let’s compute the equilibrium payments (or the prices) according to (1.9). Since the first term of 
the right side of (1.9) is the sum of the government’s payment if firm i is absent, i.e., payment for 
the band group {16, 17,18,19,20}, .2+.4+.1+.3+.4=1.4, 
 

























Note that for those who sell the licenses, they sell their licenses at their private valuations exactly. 
In other words, they make zero profit out of this reverse auction. This is not surprising, given the 
competition from the equally (least) efficient group { .   16,17,18,19,20}
 
Next we consider the case in which  6 K = . Repeating the same arguments above, we have 
 
   
* 1         for  3,4,5,6,7,8








Since the sum of the payment for {15,16,17,18,19,20} is 1.9, the equilibrium prices are: 
 





























The profits for the winning firms in this case are as follows: 
 





























So in this case, even though the prices for different procurements are not the same, the profits for 
each winning firm are the same.  However, this is not always the case, as can be illustrated by the 
following example: 
 
  1     2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20
th licensee  
4.00 01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08   09   10   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   GHz  
.5   .6   .2   .4   .3   .2   .3   .2   .5    .1    .9    .5    .5    .8    .5    .2    .4    .1    .3    .4    billion yen
 
(This example is taken from the previous table, with only the private valuations for license 9 and 
10 being modified.) 
 
In this case, if  , then again    6 K =
 
* 1         for  3,4,5,6,7,8









and the equilibrium prices and the firms’ profits are given by 
 




1.9 1.4 .5      .5 .2 .3
1.6 1.2 .4      .4 .4 0








=−= = − =
=−= = − =
=−= = − =
So in this case, not only the prices but the profits are different. When the number of the firms 
holding different licenses is large (relative to K), there will be sufficiently many competing K-
band groups. In that case the government may in general achieve efficient spectrum buyouts at a 
lower price. The first example above suggests the following corollary: 
 
Corollary:  With increasing competition, the buyout price will be close to the total value of the 
least efficient  - band group.     K
 
The modified VCG mechanism as described above can work in more general settings. For 
example, if there are many licensees that have the same frequency in different regions, the 
government needs to buy the band nationwide. In such cases, the feasible set X  can be defined 
as a matrix reflecting requirements for both the frequencies and locations of the firms. Or the 
government can require licensees to consolidate as one bidder for one “unit band” as a condition 
to apply the reverse auction.  
Another limitation of VCG mechanism is more essential: it is efficient only if every firm’s 
valuation is private information, i.e., independent of others. If there are common value 
components among firms’ valuation, VCG mechanism is not necessarily efficient because it is a 
sealed-bid auction in which nobody knows other’s valuation. When their valuations are 
interdependent, dynamic mechanisms such as “simultaneous descending auction”, a reverse 
version of the mechanism adopted for PCS auctions, would be better than VCG mechanism 
because firms can adjust their valuation by observing others’ bids. All we have proved in this 
 17article is that there exists an efficient “market-oriented” mechanism with which government can 
open spectrum and it is very cheap. Implementation of the large-scale reverse auction that can be 
held by government in practice is a very complicated task that should be left to another article. 
 
Discussion 
The value of the least efficiently used spectrum includes the NPV of the profit that would be 
gained by its user, the asset value of equipment, and transaction costs that arise when the firm 
exits (or renews the equipment). The NPV is usually determined by future cash flow, terms of 
license, interest rates, tax, and so on. In this case, however, even if an incumbent returns the 
spectrum, it can do the same business over wireless Internet when the spectrum is opened, but the 
profit would be lower because the market for the same services will be more competitive. So the 
NPV is the discounted value of monopolistic rent that would be smaller than the usual NPV.  
Even if incumbents refuse to join reverse auctions, their monopolistic rents will deteriorate 
when entrants do the same business over wireless Internet using the opened band. Therefore, if 
sufficient bandwidth is opened and incumbents are rational, we can suppose that equilibrium 
price would approach to the asset value of equipment plus transaction costs. This result coincides 
with the plan of MPHPT, which takes back spectrum while compensating for the remaining book 
value. The only difference is that the idle spectrum can be taken back right now in our 
mechanism. Thus we recommend the reverse auction as an optional mechanism together with a 
strong commitment that, after the government acquires the spectrum, it will open enough 
spectrum to wipe out monopolistic rents. 
On the other hand, once the spectrum is made a private property, as is planned by the FCC, its 
value will increase and the reverse auction will be more expensive. Faulhaber-Farber (2002) 
claims, on the contrary, that the privatization will suppress the price and make spectrum 
“commons” in the end by supplying more spectrum than its demand. If it were true, only dumb 
firms would buy the spectrum that would eventually be worthless. Or, more realistically, they 
would make every effort to prevent the asset value of spectrum from depreciating by 
monopolizing it. Strengthening their claims as property rights would make the relocation 
hopelessly difficult, as evidenced in the case of NextWave
18. 
Public users cannot be bidders, but they should be compensated for the cost of converting 
equipment or of exiting. Their bands should be evaluated as the average of the nearby bidders. 
Another problem would be posed by whether or not a public band should be sold; for example, 
the band used by air traffic control could not be sold by the market mechanism. But such usage 
should be replaced by more efficient ones; for example, radars and Global Positioning System 
(GPS) can be replaced by UWB. 
This reform might be criticized as an unfair income transfer for incumbents who are 
underutilizing allocated bands. We argue that, following the Coase Theorem, it is much more 
efficient to “bribe” incumbents to return their idle spectrum than to negotiate with them over a 
long time. The opportunity cost of wasting bandwidth and time would be much more expensive 
                                                 
18 NextWave, a new carrier that planned to operate mobile phones, bought the spectrum licenses for $4.7 billion in 
1996, but filed for bankruptcy in 1998. The FCC seized the licenses and reauctioned them in 2001, for which $16 
billion was paid. However, NextWave sued the FCC insisting that the license was its private property protected by 
the bankruptcy law. In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court supported NexWave’s claim. 
 18than the cost of buying the band back. In our scheme, the government does not have to negotiate 
with incumbents and politicians but only has to announce the reverse auction. Incumbents will 
bid and reveal their valuation of spectrum, and winners will give back their bands even if they are 
using them, as they would be reimbursed for the cost of replacing their old stations and terminals 
with WLAN.  
Some may argue that there would be no need for spectrum relocation if the overlay use were 
possible with cognitive radio technology in all bands. While this is theoretically true, cognitive 
radio is so complicated that it has not yet been implemented in portable terminals, because 
terminals have to store detailed data of other equipment’s characteristics such as power, direction, 
and timetables of radar. Moreover, if there is old analog equipment vulnerable to interference, 
new equipment must suppress the radiation very conservatively. Incumbents usually resist 
easement by overstating the risk of interference
19. For example, UWB was at last authorized for a 
very limited power and bands by the FCC in 2002, after 20 years of negotiation mainly because 
GPS is vulnerable to interference with the weak emission below the admitted level. In such cases, 
governments can have “overlay auctions” to compensate incumbents for allowing easement. In 
the long run, this would be equivalent to the reverse auctions because incumbents will renew 
their equipment that can be used as overlay. So rational incumbents would be willing to sell their 
spectrum and change their stations and terminals with the auction fees. 
The reverse auction is, as stated above, not a substitute for overlay use but a complementary 
strategy to facilitate transition in the band required for WLAN. Opening a clean band is 
obviously better than easement, so the problem is which is the faster and cheaper method for 
opening spectrum. This will depend on various factors such as progress in radio technology, the 
political power of incumbents, and so forth. Our guess is that, at least in the band above 3 GHz 
over the next 10 years, buyouts will prove to be the faster way. It would not be cheaper, but it 
could buy precious time by “bribing” incumbents. This might work as a middle-of-the-road 
solution of commons approach, which is economically efficient but politically difficult, and the 
exclusive rights approach, which is inefficient but easy. Both incumbents and entrants can benefit 
from this buyout, and we can open spectrum through a market mechanism. 
Financing might be the most difficult part of this reverse auction, because this mechanism is 
not budget-balancing and the auction fee would be much larger than in usual procurement cases. 
A simple solution is to finance the auction through general government accounts, in view of the 
fact that governments have made a great deal of money by auctioning off spectrum to private 
parties. This would cure the problem of spectrum auctions raised by Noam (1998): auctions “tax” 
the communications industry and suppress investment. Through such repayment the government 
can revitalize wireless operators, which lost a great deal of money in the collapse of the bubble. It 
is, in effect, a collective auction by millions of WLAN users, so its cost is equivalent to that of an 
ordinary spectrum auction, in which the winner will pass on its costs to the consumer.  
Another solution, probably better suited to Japan, would be to compensate the government’s 
cost of reverse auctions through spectrum usage fees. This would be more neutral to public 
finance, and raising the fee would press incumbents to use bandwidth more efficiently or to sell 
                                                 
19 This is why the “liability rules” proposed by Werbach (2003) would not work. Such rules assume that  the state 
knows the true damage of interference, but incumbents usually exaggerate the damage. It would be practical to clear 
the bands and allocate device rights to each terminals by property rules. 
 19out. If the government have auctions of device rights as we proposed above, the revenue can be 
used to finance reverse auctions. The present tariff of spectrum usage fees in Japan, however, is a 
disincentive for efficient use of bandwidth: because the fees are charged in proportion to the 
number of radio stations, more efficient users are charged more. If the fee is charged for 
bandwidth, this will offer incentives for efficient bandwidth use
20. Some parts of the spectrum 
can be sold by ordinary spectrum auctions; for example, fragmented bands between the bands for 
mobile phones in UHF band can be auctioned to mobile operators, which will generate much 
higher revenues than the buying prices. As these financing methods are complementary, 
governments could use them in combination. 
It might be risky to have governments conduct such large auctions because it could induce the 
irrational behavior such as that seen in the 3-G auctions. If sellers rushed to sell their bands as 
soon as possible, the price would be near zero, but such mistakes would be harmless for the 
government. If sellers were to collude to keep the bidding high, the government should have the 
option to quit. So it is necessary to perform preliminary experiments in the laboratory and small 
experimental reverse auctions before the full-scale buyouts. Anyway our mechanism is safer than 
the two-sided Big Bang auction in which governments cannot control the prices and monopolistic 
behavior. In our mechanism, governments can coordinate the trading process by separating 
buying and selling auctions and can make money if they want. Therefore the reverse auction can 
be adopted as a mechanism to facilitate the “hybrid” approach of the FCC because governments 
can choose whether they allocate the spectrum as unlicensed bands or private property. In 
practice, new digital wireless technologies are so efficient that it would be sufficient to open a 
few GHz for unlicensed bands. Thus three kinds of spectrum management can be applied to 
different spectrum ranges: the bands below 30 MHz can be managed by command and control or 
exclusive rights; above 2.4 GHz, all spectrum should be vacated as public goods; in the 




It is a historical lesson that 3G has failed despite so much investment from so many operators and 
almost 10 years of negotiation in the ITU, while WLAN, which has received so little attention 
from companies or governments, has succeeded unexpectedly. It suggests that the current 
framework of spectrum management, inherited from the old broadcasting model of 75 years ago, 
does not fit the Internet in which the innovation is so rapid that nobody knows what is the best 
use and who is the best user of spectrum. Furthermore, the Internet teaches us that non-profit 
mechanism can facilitate far more innovations than “market-oriented” ones do. The most 
important ingredient for innovation is not the market but the freedom that is created by 
decentralized coordination mechanisms. The Internet created the freedom by decoupling the 
platform from infrastructure with its end-to-end architecture. If we secure more freedom for 
wireless communications, vast amount of value will be created by new technologies and rich 
information made by new entrepreneurs and creators. 
                                                 
20 Other considerations are in order. The power of the station and population coverage might have to be considered. 
Radar and military radio equipment should be charged according to a different tariff. It would be difficult to charge 
unlicensed terminals, so the fee would be charged to manufacturers, as a tax for unlicensed terminals. 
 20Reforms of spectrum policy will have a great impact on the telecom regulation in general. 
Huber (1997) argues that the monopoly of “the last one-mile” was made by the FCC. Cellular-
phone and spread-spectrum technologies were invented in the 1940s, but the FCC only permitted 
cell phones in the 1980s and WLAN in the 1990s, because it wanted to allow AT&T to 
monopolize telephone lines and broadcasting stations to monopolize radio spectrum. If the 
spectrum had been opened for wireless communications in wider bands earlier, cell phones would 
have been much cheaper and would have become viable competitors to wired telephones. WLAN 
made broadband communication much cheaper than optical fiber at the edges of networks, so 
wireless networks may dominate wired ones in residential areas. Moreover, if metro networks are 
built from WLAN or other fixed wireless stations, wired and wireless networks will be combined 
in various ways, depending on the applicable costs and demand, as it does not matter which 
facilities carry them. If such a facility-based competition between wired and wireless network is 
realized, the least costly network will pull down all facilities’ costs. Then administrative bodies 
would not need to strictly regulate each individual network, but rather create an environment in 
which newcomers can join the game at any time, thus encouraging competition in the 
infrastructure. 
If communication were completely decentralized by wireless appliances, there would be no 
need for “common carriers” that integrate facilities and services vertically. Users can have 
networks nodes (i.e., wireless routers) connected by optical fiber and resell the bandwidth to 
neighbors. So competition will occur among manufacturers instead of operators who will be 
utility companies separated from services. It would be sufficient to control the quality of 
terminals at the manufacturer level, rendering centralized government control of spectrum 
unnecessary. As in the wired Internet, non-profit organizations could be entrusted with these tasks. 
It goes without saying that licensing for broadcasting stations makes no sense in the Internet 
age when moving pictures are carried over IP. Although advocates of the broadcasting industry 
demand protection of their vested interests in the name of “culture” or “public concern,” such 
problems of content are not the subject of spectrum regulation. When content is unbundled from 
facilities by IP, TV stations should be given the same treatment as newspapers and publishers. 
This would be good news for broadcasters. The abolition of licensing would bolster freedom of 
speech and give broadcasters the opportunity to become full-fledged organs of public opinion 
without government permission. In the broadband age, broadcasters’ key assets are the content 
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